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Forword 
This paper is part of the Institute's ongoing research on the transition of formerly planned 
economies to the market. It deals with an important issue; the determination of the exchange 
rate in the "free" or second economy market. The distinctive contribution of the paper is 
the treatment of this market rate as part of a portfolio of choices of economic agents among 
imported and domestic goods, domestic currencies, and foreign currencies as ways to hold assets 
in a complex and uncertain world. Policy actions and inflation are brought explicity into the 
model, which is based on the current literature of portfolio choice, and exchange rates. Particular 
attention is paid to the phenomena of overshooting in short-run exchange rate adjustments. 
The paper shows the current market rate may be a poor guide to the long-run macro equi- 
librium rate. Therefore, it suggests that considerable caution is required in using such exchange 
rates as a signal of macro equilibrium or as a nominal anchor for policy measures. 
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(June 1992) 
Linda S. Goldberg Il'dar Karimov 
New York University IIASA, Austria 
and NBER and CEMI, Moscow 
Abstract 
In the former Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe, black-market 
exchange rates and second-economy prices often are interpreted by policy-makers as 
indicative of post-reform levels. However, these exchange rates and prices can provide 
highly-biased signals for policy setting. These biases are especially important when 
exchange rates fixed on the basis of these signals are expected to play a nominal anchor 
role during stabilizations. This paper traces the paths and biases in black-market 
exchange rates, second-economy prices, hoarding stocks, and privately-held dollars 
balances after policy-initiatives or other changes in the economic environment are 
implemented. The stimuli studied are official exchange-rate adjustments, price reforms, 
foreign-aid packages, altered risks of monetary confiscation or currency reforms, and 
goods-supply related initiatives. We provide the conditions under which announcements 
of reform lead short-run prices or exchange rates to overshoot or to undershoot their 
long-run equilibrium levels. 
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York, New York 100031 is grateful for the technical support provided by The C.V. Starr Center of 
Applied Economics at New York University. She also appreciates useful discussions with Pierre-Richard 
Agenor, Jess BenHabib, Chuck Wilson and Randi Ryterman. Dr. Il'dar Karimov is grateful for the 
technical support provided by the Economic Transition and Integration Project at the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria and the Japan Foundation. 
I. Introduction 
Governments sometimes interpret current black-market exchange rates as 
indicative of post-reform equilibrium rates. For purposes of nominal exchange-rate 
targeting, policy-makers may set the fixed official exchange rates to align with current 
levels of black-market exchange rates. This interpretation of exchange rate signals is 
misleading.' When current black-market rates reflect anticipated changes in policies 
and when there is gradual adjustment of stock variables to policy initiatives, the black- 
market exchange rates are biased indicators of long-run equilibrium conditions. 
This paper presents a theoretical investigation of the relationship between 
economic-reform initiatives and the black markets for dollars and goods in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the East, restrictions still hamper free-market 
transactions in goods and financial assets. Financial markets are under-developed and 
few investment assets and outlets for savings are available to individuals. The 
existence of pervasive shortages and rigidities, the vestiges of central planning and 
controlled prices, have led the second-economy or black-market production structures 
to operate in tandem with black markets for hard currencies. Within this setting, the 
analysis first shows the direction of response of black-market exchange rates, second- 
economy prices, hoarding stocks, and privately-held dollars balances to reform 
initiatives. Second, the analysis shows the extent to which black-market exchange rates 
are poor predictors of future post-reform exchange rates. 
Due to the paucity of financial instruments, the proliferation of consumption- 
goods shortages and the uncertainty about their future supplies, one principal form of 
investment and intertemporal transfer of wealth is through purchases of storable 
consumption goods.2 Other important vehicles for savings are domestic-currency 
balances (or savings accounts) and foreign exchange holdings. In the recent period, the 
lln addition, such policy rules can lead to instability as  in Kharas and Pinto (1989). 
20n Soviet savings activity, also see Klachko (1988), Ofer and Pickersgill (1980), and an updated 
discussion by Alexeev (1991). 
extreme uncertainty of valuation of domestic currencies and of goods availability has 
dramatically increased the desire to accumulate foreign currency, mainly dollars, and 
any available consumer goods. For example, in the former Soviet Union, this saving 
activity traditionally had taken the form of currency, savings deposits, 3 percent lottery 
bonds, consumer durables and jewelry [Ofer and Pickersgill, 19801. 
As a consequence of these financial structures, the theory presented herein 
incorporates this feature of incomplete financial markets. The investment opportunities 
available to the consumer/ investors include hoarding of goods, hard-currency 
accumulation, and domestic-currency savings. Since our model introduces a demand for 
second-economy goods that arises from both investment and consumption motives, 
rather than from consumption motives only, a range of reform initiatives have 
significantly different effects than those predicted by existing studies. This broader 
approach is better-suited for the reforming economies of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. In contrast to the conventional approaches, actual and anticipated goods- 
market initiatives, in addition to initiatives aimed directly at financial markets, 
simultaneously affect both exchange rates and prices, and the long-run state of both 
goods markets and financial markets. This facilitates a rich discussion of the dynamic 
effects of a range of anticipated and unanticipated reforms on the amount of hoarding 
of consumption goods, on inflation in the second-economy, on the black-market 
exchange rate, and on black-market trade volumes in transition economies. 
The theory builds on two themes developed in other contexts. The first body of 
literature models the determinants of black-market exchange rates in developing 
countries. Motivated in particular by the experiences of Latin American economies, 
these models interpret black-market currency demands as arising from "portfolio" 
motives, wherein changes in the risk, return and stocks of various financial assets drive 
the currency price.3 [de Macedo, 1982 and 1987; Dornbusch et al., 19831 Black 
markets for currencies arise, in part, from their functions as conduits for flight capital 
into foreign investments. Recent theoretical extensions to this literature have explored 
the fiscal ramifications of policies intended to unify black and official market exchange 
rates, and the feedback into black-market premia [Pinto, 19911. 
The second related body of literature is the well-known theory of goods and 
financial-market interactions, as developed in the dynamic-adjustment models based on 
the seminal Dornbusch exchange-rate overshooting framework. In these models, there 
are two distinct markets: the market for financial assets and the market for goods. In 
the context of the reforming economies of Eastern Europe, this literature provides a 
useful vehicle for analyzing the dynamic effects of changes in the financial and goods 
market structures. Nonetheless, even in this literature, in which important contributions 
are made on financial market reforms by Calvo and Frenkel (1991) and on exchange 
rate unification by Agenor and Flood (1992), the assumption of distinct markets is 
maintained in efforts to study the role of policy initiatives in centrally-planned 
economies when there are imperfections in domestic financial markets. 
The separability of the goods markets and financial markets, even in the very 
short-run, is an inappropriate assumption for the economies of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. Reform of the production structure, anticipated or actual, will 
alter the attractiveness of the hoarding of goods. Since hoarding demand is determined 
alongside the demand for the other assets treated as stores of value, "real-side" reforms 
will be reflected immediately in asset prices, including the price of foreign currency in 
the black markets. Likewise, currency-market reforms impinge on the activities of 
goods markets. Therefore, in the theoretical analyses of this paper, we explore the 
3 ~ o l l a r s  are held by individuals as a means of diversifying a "portfolio" of assets to maximize their 
expected return on "investedw wealth and minimize the variance of these returns. 
effects of policy initiatives without imposing the assumption that goods markets and 
financial markets are separable. 
Depending on the reforms announced (and their credibility), the black-market 
exchange rate either can undershoot or overshoot the post-reform equilibrium exchange 
rate. For example, in the former Soviet Union, a dramatic example of exchange-rate 
overshooting occurred in February 1992. This panic episode reportedly was triggered 
by a shortage of cash rubles in circulation and by the announcement by the central 
government that (via foreign-exchange market intervention) the ruble would be 
appreciating against the dollar. In mid-February the ruble appreciated from 135 rubles 
per dollar to 60 to 65 rubles per dollar. At the same time, there was a dramatic 
increase in efforts to purchase consumer durables as an alternative to foreign exchange 
as a store-of-value. The reversal of the decline in the value of dollars in Moscow 
occurred as people who had been queuing to sell dollars realized that goods purchased 
for dollars in hard-currency shops actually were cheaper than in some ruble shops. The 
demand for dollars recovered. Within a month, by mid-March, the ruble returned to 
close to its mid-February level, much less sharply appreciated than in the very short 
run. The path of the value of the ruble against the dollar was predictable. Despite the 
enthusiastic proclamations by policy-makers in Russia, the theory of exchange-rate 
determination shows that the observed short-run gains in the value of the ruble against 
the dollar did not provide any lasting signals about the long-run health of the ruble. 
Motivated by such events, and by noting that policy-makers tend to place 
considerable weight on observed short-run exchange rates, we show the dynamic effects 
of specific reform initiatives on the amount of hoarding of consumption goods, on 
inflation in the second-economy, on the black-market exchange rate, and on black- 
market trade volumes in transition economies. This provides important intuition about 
the biases inherent in exchange rates and in prices between the time of announcement 
of a pending or actual event and the overall adjustment of the economy to that event. 
It is easy to provide additional examples of this misuse of black-market 
exchange rates for purposes of official exchange-rate targeting. In Poland the official 
zloty-dollar exchange rate initially was priced at an undervalued level, at precisely the 
rate prevailing in the free market [Nuti, 19911. Moreover, "the free market rate became 
an important and popular institution, an indicator of the state of the economy, while the 
dollar became the only stable reference point in an otherwise rapidly changing 
economic environment" [Olechowski and Oles, p. 158, 199 11. In the former Soviet 
Union, the black-market exchange rate was used as a reference point for the crawling- 
peg exchange-rate regime introduced between July 1990 and October 1991 [Goldberg, 
19921. In Bulgaria, the black-market exchange rates played an important role in the 
reform discussions that took place in early 1991. Initially, reformers had expected that 
"the introduction of convertibility would mean acceptance of an exchange rate close to 
the present black market rate" [Dimitrov, p.255 19911. After liberalization of the 
exchange rate and to the surprise of the reformers, "in spite of the sharp initial price 
rise, however, the exchange rate then appreciated from 25 leva to the dollar to the 
range of 15 to 18 leva to the dollar by June 1991 " [Dimitrov, p.263 1991].4 
Another contribution of the theory is the insight it provides into the meaning of 
"monetary overhang". Under underdeveloped financial markets, the risk-adjusted 
returns on money may not be dominated by those on alternative investment assets. The 
portfolio model is used to generate equations for the theoretically "optimal" demand for 
money balances in the transition economy. These demands are distinct from those 
generated by current transactions motives and are not related exclusively to stochastic 
future consumption opportunitie~.~ 
The overall plan of the paper is as follows. First, in Section I1 we develop the 
model of the black-market for foreign exchange and its relationship with goods-market 
4 ~ e e  also Kharas and Pinto (1989) on Bolivia. 
5 ~ o r  further discussion of the monetaryaverhang issues see Dornbusch and Wolf (1990) and Alexeev 
(1991). 
activities. This model is applied to determine, theoretically, the effects of various 
announced and enacted real and monetary reforms. Section 111 presents the adjustment 
paths of black-market exchange rates, second-economy goods prices, dollar balances in 
private portfolios, and hoarding stocks. Section IV concludes with discussions of 
policy implications and potentially useful extensions of this work. As noted, the results 
are important for stabilization efforts, since policy-makers may improperly interpretate 
current black-market exchange-rate levels as indicative of post-reform equilibrium 
levels. 
II. The Model: Black Markets for Foreign Currencies and Goods Hoarding 
Two aspects of the demand and supply for (black) foreign exchange and for 
second-economy consumer goods are considered. The first aspect is derived from 
"financial" or investment motives for holding foreign currency and hoarding goods, 
and is subsumed under the heading of "portfolio" or speculative currency-demands. 
This is developed in Section 1I.A. The second aspect is related to current consumption 
needs and is subsumed under the heading of transaction demands with smuggling. 
Section 1I.B formulates transactions and consumption demands, along with adjustment 
equations in goods markets and in the second-economy current-account. Section 111 
considers the dynamic effects of the reform initiatives. 
II.A. Portfolio Demands for Foreign Currency in the Black Market 
The consumer/investor chooses an optimal division of his wealth among 
domestic savings, foreign savings, and hoarding of goods. The investment assets have 
some trend rates of return, and each of these returns have a stochastic element 
(represented by a Brownian-motion diffusion term). Below, we present the choices 
available to consumer/investors and the solution to their optimal investment decisions. 
The technical details of the derivation of optimal demands for the respective assets are 
provided in Appendix I. 
Domestic savings, denoted by B, have an expected nominal return of ib equal to 
the interest paid on domestic-currency savings deposits. There is some risk ob 
associated with this form of savings: it is possible that the account will be confiscated 
in a monetary reform.6 One example of this risk is the reduction in East German 
household savings that occurred in the process of German unification. Alternatively, if 
domestic currency is held in the form of cash balances (i,,=O), there is a risk that cash 
holdings outside of the savings accounts will be invalidated, as in the January 1991 
"monetary reform" in the former Soviet Union. 
Another asset available to the consumer/investor is foreign-currency 
accumulated through the black market. Throughout the paper we refer to this foreign 
exchange as dollars. In practice, dollars, along with Finnish marks, are popular in the 
former Soviet Union. Austrian shillings and German marks are popular transaction 
currencies in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The domestic-currency value of these 
foreign-exchange holdings, denoted by SF, is the product of the quantity of dollars 
held, F, multiplied by the black-market exchange rate S, defined as units of domestic 
currency per unit of foreign exchange (rubles per dollar). Domestic residents are 
prohibited from opening interest-bearing foreign-currency acco~nts .~  Consequently, 
foreign-exchange holdings do not yield a nominal r e t ~ r n . ~  The valuation and rate-of- 
return on these dollar stocks depends on the process defining the short-run black-market 
6 ~ n  terms of the theory, this risk is represented as the standard deviation of the diffusion process on 
returns on domestic currency assets. Analogous interpretations will apply to other risk measures 
introduced. 
7 ~ h i s  assumption is not important for our results and easily could be relaxed. 
wuld easily introduce expected costs of obtaining and later liquidating black-market foreign 
exchange, as consumer/investors pay a range of fees to money dealers. Also, it is possible to introduce a 
parameter reflecting the risks associated with holding foreign exchange, due to the likelihood of being 
caught by authorities and penalized. 
exchange rate. The expected rate of depreciation of the ruble against the dollar is given 
by 4 and the standard deviation of this forecast is a,. 
The third investment opportunity is through hoarding storable goods, G, valued 
at second-economy prices P,. The expected return on hoarding is the expected rate of 
increase in durable-goods prices, x ,  (i.e. the inflation rate on domestic goods), less the 
cost of obtaining or storingthese goods, c,, over the same interval of time for which the 
inflation series is measured. This cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of 
waiting in queues or searching for the goods [see Stahl and Alexeev (1985) and 
Weitzman (1991)l. The scale of uncertainty in the forecast of future goods availability 
and future inflation is subsumed within the index o,. 
These investments are made out of available nominal wealth stock W, defined 
by: 
W =  B + P,G+ SF (1) 
and the portfolio shares allocated to the respective assets are denoted by: 
h, = P,GIW, h, = SFIW, and h, = (1- h, - h) = BIW. (2) 
The objective of the consumer/ investor is to choose portfolio shares optimally in order 
to maximize the expected real return on his portfolio while minimizing its variability. 
maximize 
A, 9 h, 
where R is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, w = W/Q is real wealth, and Q is 
the price index of the consumption basket. Consumption occurs over two types of 
goods, domestic goods and imported goods. 
Domestic goods enter the price index with weight a .9  Imported goods enter the 
price index with weight (1-a). Importers are price-takers in the market for foreign 
9 ~ h e  domestic goods can be hoarded, consumed internally, or exported. If exported, these goods are 
traded at prices determined in domestic markets, so that the exporters are not price-takers in world- 
markets. 
products. The aggregate price index is a weighted average of the price of domestic 
goods, P,, and the imported-goods price, SP with P= 1 hereafter. The domestic 
import price follows the black-market exchange rate. 
Table 1 Variable Definitions and Description 
B Domestic financial assets (savings accounts or money) 
l b  Expected nominal return on B 
O b  Risk associated with nominal returns ib(monetary confiscation 
possible) 
S Black-market exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign) 
F Quantity of foreign currency in circulation in black markets 
4 Expected nominal depreciation rate in black market 
Of Risk or uncertainty associated with black-market depreciation forecast 
ps Second-economy goods prices 
G Net supply of hoardable goods in the second economy 
x Expected inflation rate on second-economy goods 
Os Uncertainty associated with inflation or goods-availability forecast 
W Nominal wealth 
Q Domestic aggregate price index 
a Share of domestic goods in the domestic price index 
P" Official-sector1 controlled prices on goods 
So Official exchange rate 
Y Food aid or supply supplements in goods markets 
Cost of obtaining or holding second-economy goods for hoarding 
Cg (ex. depreciation or lost wages) 
The derived optimal-portfolio shares are provided in the technical appendix. 
There are two components of the optimal demands for the respective assets: the optimal 
minimum-variance and optimal speculative portfolios. The assets demanded through the 
minimum-variance portfolio are precisely equal to their shares in the future 
consumption baskets of individuals: aW is minimum-variance investment in real goods, 
while (l-a)W is the minimum-variance holding of foreign exchange. A short position 
is taken in domestic currency assets to offset the long minimum-variance position in the 
other two investment alternatives. However, this does not imply that negative stocks 
and demands for domestic currency (i.e. net borrowing) prevail. The second 
component of the optimal portfolio demands, the speculative portfolio demands for 
domestic-currency assets, would be required to be positive and at least as great as the 
negative minimum-variance demands. As shown in the technical appendix, this 
implies that domestic interest rates must be at least as great as the returns on alternative 
assets, net of a linear combination of their expected variances and covariances. 
For conciseness and brevity, at this point it is sufficient to present only the signs 
of the asset-demand elasticities with respect to various parameters of financial markets. 
Appendix Table A1 presents the full set of equations and results on optimal portfolio 
shares. Asset demands are normal, so that A,% > 0 and h4 > 0. The higher the expected 
inflation ' r r )  on the hoarded goods (the lower the expected future goods availability) the 
higher the current speculative-portfolio demand for durable goods (A). This 
responsiveness is decreasing in the relative-risk-aversion of the investor, since the 
source of demand for durables is the investor's attempts at minimizing the variance of 
his investment portfolio. The responsiveness of portfolio demands to changes in n is 
influenced by the variances and covariances of the returns on alternative assets, but not 
by the expected returns on those assets. 
Changes in the risk associated with returns to hoarding or holding domestic 
currency have first-order and second-order effects on investment demands. For 
example, the first-order effect of increased supply uncertainty, through og2, operates to 
directly reduce the portfolio demand for goods (i.e. hoarding) and to increase the 
demand for foreign and domestic currency.1° The second-order effect of increased 
supply uncertainty works through altering the responsiveness of asset demands to other 
policy and process changes: for example, as og2 rises, the expansionary effect on goods 
hoarding of increasing ~r is reduced. 
Table 2 Asset Demand Functions: Signs of Demand Elasticities 
0 b 2  02 i b  C, 4 X 
effect on demand for \ 
goods-hoarding 4 + 1  - 2  - - + - 
dollars 4 + 1  + - + + - 
home-assets % - 1  + + + - - 
l: Unambiguously satisfied if 13 > 0. 
2: Unambigously satisfied if R- cg - ib > pgS(d + 4 - p g S )  ( d + d )  
322 1 - ( d + < ) ( n - c , - ~ - a . ' , - ( l - a ) ~ )  3: - < 0 requires a < - 34 A r +(d + p , ) ( @ - i ,  - ( I -  a)< -a&) 
where ~ = ( d  +C()(d +<) - (4  +pgS)' 
1 
Likewise, consider the impact of increasing the risk of monetary reform, ob2. 
Under reasonable conditions, this policy initiative either will increase the demand for 
hoarding and for holding foreign currency as investment assets. 
1°1t is theoretically possible to reverse the sign of these elasticities, but this is only likely to occur with 
0. 
These derivations are important for two immediate reasons. First, they link 
hoarding-demands for goods and demands for foreign exchange to actual and expected 
changes in prices, policies, and perceived risks of monetary and goods-supply shocks to 
the economy. Second, the demand elasticities formally are shown to be sensitive to a 
variety of policy parameters. Another level of importance for these parameters arises 
below, when they are combined with a specification of flow relationships to determine 
equilibria in the second-economy for goods and in the market for dollars. In the short- 
run, exchange rates and prices adjust to ensure asset-market equilibrium, although 
excess supply or demand may occur in goods markets and second-economy trade 
imbalance may develop. The medium run supply response enables stock adjustments to 
occur in amounts of goods hoarded and in the amount of dollars accumulated or 
decumulated through illicit cross-border trades. In turn, these stock adjustments trigger 
the exchange rate and price adjustments required for maintaining asset-market 
equilibrium. In the long-run, asset markets, second-economy goods markets, and the 
illicit trade balance are in equilibrium. 
The asset-market component of market equilibrium, achieved through second- 
economy exchange rate and price adjustments, can be presented in reduced form. 
Collecting all demand influences other than 4 and .rc into the vector Z, and multiplying 
the optimal-portfolio shares by stocks of investable wealth, the conditions for stock 
equilibrium in the asset markets are given by: 
XI( 4, x , Z)(B+ P,G+SF) = PgG (4) 
%( 4, x , Z)(B+ PgG+SF) = SF ( 5 )  
where Z =(0,2,0,2, ib, cg ). 
Equations (4) and ( 5 )  provide two equations in two endogenous unknowns, S 
and P,. Both the black-market exchange rate and the second-economy price of goods 
are assumed to be perfectly flexible (where the goods-price flexibility also contrasts 
with the more conventional approaches). The values of these variables that imply 
equilibrium in these asset markets depend on the type of expectations that regulate 4 
and x .  We will examine two cases: i) assuming that expectations are static, 4=  x =  0; 
and ii) assuming perfect foresight, wherein consumerlinvestors anticipate the future 
values of S and P, that will result after the market responds to initial disturbances. 
B. Transactions1 Consumption Demands on the Black Market 
To complete the specification of markets for foreign exchange and storable 
goods, it is necessary to introduce non-portfolio-related flows. In this respect, the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries do not differ fundamentally from other 
countries with active parallel-markets. For the foreign-exchange market, as discussed in 
depth by Agenor (1992), there are five possible sources of illegal foreign-currency 
flows. These are the under-invoicing or smuggling of exports, over-invoicing of 
imports, flows from foreign tourists, and diversion of remittances through non-official 
channels. Surpluses or deficits in the second-economy trade balance, generated by 
changes in the net supply of private dollars, are represented by equation (6). 
wheret, = t s  >Oandt,=t,  >O 
- 
p8 9 
Transactionsl consumption demands for dollars arise from the desire to purchase 
foreign goods for immediate consumption. As the relative price of smuggled imports 
S/P, rises, the relative demand for domestic goods rises and demand for foreign goods 
falls (domestic availability of dollars increases). This leads to an improvement in the 
second-economy trade balance and accumulation of dollars, so that t,=tSq > 0. 
The availability of foreign currency in the domestic economy also is influenced 
by the black-market exchange-rate premium, $/So, defined as the ratio of the black- 
market exchange rate to the official exchange rate offered to tourist or would-be 
emigrants. Increases in the black-market currency premium improve the second- 
economy trade balance by increasing the transactions-supply of dollars, so that in 
equation (6) h=t,,p >O. These flows arise from tourist activities and from exporters 
who are paid in foreign exchange. l1 
The determinants of changes in goods availability in the second economy are 
shown in equation (7). 
Two relative prices influence the net supply of goods. First, the consumption 
demand for second-economy goods is increasing (net supply is decreasing) in the 
relative price of imported to second-economy prices of domestic goods, S/P,, so that 
g,=g,,,, < 0. Second, the net supply of goods is increasing in the ratio of the free- 
market price P, to the government-controlled price of goods, P. Demand for secondary 
market goods decreases in P, and supply increases in P,. The supply response to P, is 
attributed to increased theft of goods from the official sector. Thus, the overall effects 
of increased P, are unambiguous. 
The impact of changes in government-controlled prices is less clear-cut. First, 
an increase in official prices can lead to a reduction in the supply diverted to secondary 
markets, since the premium to theft is reduced. In the official sector, more goods are 
available but at higher prices. Hence, demand in the second-economy declines as P 
increases. The supply effects dominate, so that g, = gp,lp, > 0. Also relevant for 
goods-availability are supply shocks. These can be domestically induced or generated 
by foreign-aid flows in the form of goods. Represented by y, these supplement 
domestic supplies so that g, = gy > 0. l2 
llsee Dornbusch et al. (1983). Note also that the function representing the net supply of dollars easily 
can be modified to account for the considerable obstacles that limit East-West trade. Historically, these 
obstacles have included prohibitive border-taxes, tariffs, and more subtle costs of illicit activity. 
1 2 ~ h e  black-market premium on currency is not introduced explicitly. Instead, the price of goods in 
unofficial or free internal markets relative to the controlled price on state goods is relevant here since 
goods can be diverted from internal official goods-markets to internal unofficial goods-markets. 
The long-run is characterized by equilibrium in the current account (i.e. 
balanced smuggling) F = 0,  and in the second-economy goods market (i.e. no additions 
or reductions of hoarding stocks), G = 0. Also, in the long-run, 4 = x  = 0.13 
III. Dynamic Effects of Reform Initiatives 
In this section we apply the model to trace the dynamic effects of a range of 
reform initiatives. These initiatives are: i) Official1 Tourist exchange-rate devaluation 
(increase in So); ii) Relaxation of the state-controlled prices of goods, either through 
one-shot price adjustment or liberalization (increase in P); iii) Altered supply of 
domestic goods via production reform or international aid (increase in y); iv) Altered 
restrictiveness of monetary policy (change in B or i,); v) Increased risk of monetary 
reform through domestic-currency confiscation (increase in a,); and vi) Increased 
variability of goods supplies (increase in a,). 
Before tracing these results, intuition about the adjustment process driving the 
price and stock variables can be drawn from examining only one dimension of the 
model in our paper. Suppose we fix the price and quantity of second-economy goods at 
constant levels, and examine only the activity in black markets for foreign currency. 
Ignoring the goods market, the demand for dollars is the only asset-market equilibrium 
condition (FF), and the current-account balance is the only flow 
equilibrium condition. Figure 1 shows these curves in the space of S, the black-market 
exchange rate, and F, the dollars accumulated through second-economy trade 
imbalances. 
13while we use 4 x 3  as the steady-state condition of our model, in practice these inflation and 
depreciation rates will return to some "normal" rates determined by forces outside of the scope of the 
model, which need not equal zero. For example, these forces would include the dynamic path of money 
creation. Any discussion herein of short-run and long-run activity clearly is limited to the specific forces 
triggered by the events analyzed w i t h  this paper. 
CAB, 
CAB, 
F 
F 
- Figure 1- 
An unanticipated devaluation of the official exchange rate reduces the 
availability of currency supplied to the black market, shifting upward the CAB curve 
from CABo to CAB,. Instantaneously, the exchange rate adjusts from 2 to restore asset- 
market equilibrium. Under static expectations, since the asset-market equilibrium curve 
does not shift, the exchange rate is unchanged in the short-run. Under rational 
expectations, agents expect future depreciation of the domestic currency. This 
immediately raises the demand for foreign currency and leads to a black-market 
depreciation from 2 to d. In both static and rational expectations cases, the economy 
runs a second-economy current-account deficit and decumulates dollars. This process of 
dollar reductions in private (or black-market) tillers and gradual black-market exchange 
rate depreciation continues until the new equilibrium is attained at $. At this long-run 
steady state, the economy has decumulated enough foreign exchange and depreciated 
the black-market rate sufficiently to restore equilibrium in both asset markets and in 
external (second-economy) accounts. 
This type of dynamic adjustment also occurs in the full model presented herein, 
although it's dimensionality prevents graphical representation. In our case, there are 
two variables (both black-market prices and exchange rates) that adjust instantaneously 
to yield asset-market equilibrium. The dynamics of the real as well as the nominal 
black-market exchange rates are specified, since the paths of both nominal exchange 
rates and prices are determined. In addition, there are two flow adjustment-equations 
that dictate the accumulation of G and F along the path to the long-run equilibrium.14 
For example, consider the effect of an unanticipated official exchange-rate 
devaluation. Under the static-expectations assumption, neither of the asset-market- 
equilibrium conditions shift and there is no instantaneous equilibrating adjustment of 
either S or B. However, the second-economy current account moves into deficit. The 
depreciation of the black rate lowers the net available supply of goods in the internal 
goods-markets. Ultimately, the resulting stock and price adjustments lead to a reduced 
internal supply of goods, reduced dollar holdings, and increased prices of both goods 
and foreign exchange. Both the real and the nominal exchange rates are depreciated in 
the long run. Under perfect foresight, the unanticipated official devaluations lead to 
short-run jumps in both exchange rates and prices. Although the long-run is the same 
in the perfect foresight and static expectations scenarios, the transition path to the 
long-run will depend on whether or not short-run overshooting occurs. 
Below, we develop the dynamics of price and stock adjustments to the 
forementioned range of policy initiatives. While it is assumed throughout that policy 
changes are unanticipated, this is not crucial for the results. Announcements of policy 
changes in advance of their actual enactment serve to initiate the adjustment process at 
an earlier point in time, without altering the long-run equilibrium of the system.15 
However, we do distinguish between the response to reform initiatives when alternative 
expectations-formation mechanisms are imposed. Solutions are provided under both 
static-expectations and perfect-foresight assumptions. 
141t is assumed that the market chooses the stable and convergent trajectory. As in all models of this 
type, this assumption may not be valid. 
l5see Wilson (1979). 
III A. Effects of Policy Initiatives Under Static Expectations 
In the very short-run, under static expectations, the only policies that cause 
instantaneous adjustments of prices and exchange rates are those that directly shift asset 
demands or supplies. Such policies include changes in the supplies of domestic credit 
(B) or changes in the risk-return characteristics of any of the investment assets. The 
short-run and long-run effects of these policy initiatives under the static-expectations 
assumption are summarized in Table 3. Also shown are the long-run equilibrium effects 
of policy initiatives on foreign currency held by the private second-economy and on the 
overall supply of storable goods (i.e. hoarding). 
An increase in the supply of B in agent's portfolios implies that weights on 
assets held in investor portfolios are in disequilibrium at current prices. Demands for F 
and G, the other investment assets, increase, instantaneously driving up the prices of 
both foreign exchange and goods. In the very short run, the jumps in black-market 
exchange rates and in prices overshoot their long-run levels. Therefore, after the initial 
jump, the medium-run adjustment process is described by deflation of prices and 
recovery of the value of the domestic currency in foreign-exchange markets. The initial 
price adjustment triggered imbalances in net-consumption in goods markets and illicit 
external accounts. This ultimately leads to an accumulation by households of both 
dollars and stocks of storable goods. 
Under static-expectations, an official-exchange-rate devaluation (increase in So) 
does not immediately influence asset-market supplies or demands, and hence does not 
instantaneously affect exchange rates or prices in the second economy. However, the 
official devaluation reduces the attractiveness to tourists of supplying of foreign 
currency in the second economy, and F stocks decline. The consequent imbalances in 
investor portfolios (due to excess demand for available F) are eliminated by adjustments 
in asset prices. Although there are no short-run jumps in prices or black-market 
exchange rates, the medium-run is characterized by inflation in goods prices and 
persistent black-market exchange-rate depreciations. The long-run effects on exchange 
rates and prices are presented in the Appendix. The gradual effect of the initial official 
exchange-rate devaluation is a reduction in foreign-currency holdings by households, a 
decline in household hoarding stocks, and depreciated black-market exchange rates and 
the increased prices of hoarded goods. 
Table 3 Static Expectations Effects of Policy Initiatives 
S hort-Run Im~act Long-Run or Steadv-State Impact 
on - on 
Policv Initiative S p~ S pe F G 
Price Reform (P") 0 0 + + - 
"Food" Aid (y) 0 0 - - + + 
Official Devalu. (So) 0 0 + + - - 
Bond sale (B) + + 0 0 + + 
Confiscat. threat (ab2) + + 0 0 + + 
Supply ~ncertainty(o,~) + - 1 0 0 + - 1 
+ 3 increase. - 3 decrease. 0 3 no effect. 
I: See Table 2 for necessary and sufficient conditions on this partial derivative. 
Analogous explanations can be provided for the adjustment processes following 
the other shocks presented in Table 3. One parameter of particular interest is that of 
0,2, the effects of increased risk of monetary reform. As long as positive real money 
balances are held for portfolio purposes, an increase in the risk of monetary reform will 
cause substitution away from money balances and domestic savings, driving up the 
price of hoarded goods and foreign currency. These short-run exchange rate and price 
responses unambiguously overshoot the long-run effects, wherein S and Pg return to 
their initial levels. Following an increase in o,*, there is a jump depreciation of the 
nominal black market exchange rate and a price increase. The short-run real exchange 
rate response depends on the asset shares in the economy. The medium run is 
characterized by domestic-currency appreciation and price deflation, while agents 
accumulate both hard-currency balances and increase their goods hoarding. 
IIIB. Black-Markets and Hoarding Adjustments Under Perfect Foresight 
The more interesting dynamic effects are derived under the assumption that 
agents have perfect foresight.I6 Herein, policy initiatives that affect goods markets, 
cross-border illicit activity, and asset markets all have instantaneous effects. Agents 
understand that the economy ultimately will adjust to the policy changes, and they 
temper their immediate reactions accordingly. 
As formalized below, the short-run perfect foresight movements of exchange 
rates and prices are functions of the extent of the substitutability and complementarity 
among demands for foreign assets, demand for hoarding, and demand for domestic 
assets. The results also are functions of the share of each asset in the domestic portfolio 
and the variances and covariances of the asset returns. The short-run effects of policy 
initiatives under perfect foresight, and the conditions that must be satisfied for short-run 
overshooting of long-run equilibria by exchange rates and prices, are summarized in 
Table 4. The contents of this table reflects our interest in two questions: (i) What is the 
short-run impact (in terms of direction) on black-market exchange rates of policy 
initiatives? and (ii) Do we observe that short-run exchange rates overshoot or 
undershoot long-run equilibria? This latter question has bearing on whether 
depreciation (or appreciation) or inflation (or deflation) will characterize the medium- 
run adjustment. Table 4 does not reproduce the long-run or steady-state effects of 
I6The complete mathematical derivations of these results are given in Technical Appendix T2. 
policy initiatives under rational expectations: these are the same as those already 
presented in Table 3 for the static-expectations case. 
Table 4 Perfect Foresight Effects of Policies on S and Pg 
Short-Run Impact Relation to Long-Run Equilibrium Value 
Price Reform (P) 
on &change Rates + 
on Prices + 
Comments 
"Food" Aid ( y ) 
on Exchange Rates - 
on Prices - 
Comments 
Official Deval. (So) 
on Exchange Rates + 
on Prices + 
Comments 
Bond sale (B) 
on Exchange Rates + 
on Prices + 
Comments 
Confi i t ion risk (a,) 
on Exchange Rates + 
on Prices + 
Comments 
nSupply'' risk (a,) 
on Exchange Rates + 
on Prices - 
Comments 
Short-Run Overshooting if Condition 1 is satisfied. 
Short-Run Overshooting if Condition 3 is satisfied. 
a ts, o<-<- In the long-run, PB 
Short-Run Overshooting if Condition 2 is satisfied. 
S hort-Run Overshooting if Condition 4 is satisfied. 
In the long-run, 171 < 171 
Short-Run Overshooting if Condition 1 is satisfied. 
Short-Run Overshooting if Condition 3 is satisfied. 
In the long-run, 
8 a o<-<- 
P, 
Short-run exchange-rate overshooting. 
Short-run price overshooting. 
In the long-run, changes in B are neutral with 
respect to S and P,. 
Short-run exchange-rate overshooting. 
Short-run price overshooting. 
In the long-run, changes in o, are neutral with 
respect to S and P,. 
Short-run exchange-rate overshooting. 
Short-run price overshooting. 
In the long-run, changes in og are neutral with 
respect to S and P,. 
Those real shocks to the economy that are neutral with respect to exchange rates 
and prices, changes in B, a, and a,, lead to identical adjustment dynamics under the 
static-expectations and perfect-foresight cases. By contrast, when shifts occur in PO, So 
and y, short-run movements in exchange rates are triggered by the anticipation of future 
movements in exchange rates and prices. These short-run movements are given by: 
In the system provided in (8), short-run expected proportional movements in S 
and B (i.e. 4 and x ) ,  by assumption, are proportional to the long-run expected changes 
in these variables. l7 This is expressed in (9). 
By eq.(g) and some algebraic manipulation, we can rewrite the short-run 
movements in exchange rates and prices in terms of elasticities conditions: 
Under perfect foresight, official exchange-rate devaluations instantaneously lead 
to jump depreciations of the black-market exchange rate and increases in prices of 
hoarded goods. These jumps were not observed in the static-expectations case. 
However, the absence of jumps also would occur in the perfect foresight case if the 
official devaluation had been announced in advance. At the announcement date, the 
4 A, A, I 3  
l7 It is possible to complicate this expectations rule by permitting current one-period-ahead expectations 
of price and exchange rate changes to be non-unity fractions of long-run expected changes. Whle this 
modification is technically not difficult, it unnecessarily complicates the discussion without adding much 
additional intuition. 
LR for &'".rSO.dy 
jump would have occurred.18 Moreover, the effect on short-run exchange rates is 
proportionately greater than the effect on hoarded goods prices. Likewise, increases in 
official sector goods prices and goods-supply shocks have greater (absolute) effects on 
prices than on exchange rates under perfect foresight, since agents react to expected 
long-run movements in these variables. The market response to changes in B, a, and 
a, is analogous under the static-expectations and perfect-foresight cases, since agents 
understand the long-run neutrality of these variables with respect to S and Pg. 
To determine whether the perfect-foresight short-run equilibria imply over- or 
under-shooting of long-run (second-economy) exchange rates and prices, for the 
changes in P, So, y , B, a, and 5, we compare the long-run changes in S and B with 
the expectations-based changes that initiate the dynamic adjustments of these prices. 
The explicit long-run effects on S and B are derived from the matrices presented in 
Appendix 11. 
We focus on the conditions for exchange-rate overshooting without providing an 
extensive discussion of the issue of second-economy price overshooting. This emphasis 
is motivated by the specific purpose of understanding the conditions under which black 
market exchange-rates overstate or understate long-run equilibrium values and therefore 
provide biased signals to policy-makers who interpret the observed black-market 
exchange rates as representing long-run equilibrium levels. Nonetheless, conditions for 
price overshooting are provided for reference at the end of the section. 
The likelihood of overshooting depends both on which shocks barrage the 
economy and on the elasticities of demand in both asset and goods markets. Since 
both official exchange-rate devaluation and official goods-price increases lead to 
long-run black-market exchange-rate depreciations, Condition I ,  below, for short- 
a 
-
a 
>- 
run exchange-rate overshooting, determines whether 9 I, 9 I,. By contrast, 
1 8 ~ o r  a related discussion see Agenor and Flood (1992). 
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since increases in food-aid (or goods-supply increments) lead black-market exchange 
rates to appreciate in the long-run, for Condition 2 the inequality in the overshooting 
condition will be reversed .I9 
Condition 1: For oficial-price increases and oficial exchange-rate devaluations 
to lead to short-run exchange-rate overshooting, the necessary and suflcient 
condition is 
Condition 2: For positive goods-supply shocks and increased food availability to 
lead to short-run exchange-rate overshooting, the necessary and sufficient 
condition is 
Exchange-rate overshooting in response to official price increases or official 
exchange-rate devaluations depends on the expected long-run movements of exchange 
rates and prices, and on the price elasticities of demand for foreign currency and 
domestic currency within domestic "financial" markets. Both official price increases 
and official exchange-rate devaluations lead to long-run increases in black-market 
exchange rates (depreciations) and second-economy prices. In the long-run, the official 
exchange-rate devaluation has a greater proportional expansionary impact on exchange 
rates, while the official price increase has a larger proportional expansionary effect on 
prices. 
Effects of Increased Domestic Credit or Increased Risk of Monetary-Reform: Both 
increased risk of monetary reforms (increases in ab2)  and increased availability of 
domestic investment assets (B) lead to short-run exchange-rate overshooting. These 
policy shocks lead to non-expectations-based short-run shifts in asset demands, but are 
l91n the technical appendix we discuss the stability conditions of this model. As a four variable nonlinear 
differential equation system, it requires specific parameters for decisive statements on stability. 
neutral in the long-run with respect to black-market exchange rates and prices. 
Consequently, the static and rational expectations behavior of these prices are 
analogous: there are immediate jumps in exchange rates and prices which always 
overshoot long-run equilibrium levels. Over time these movements are reversed and, 
through compensating stock adjustments, exchange rates and prices return to initial 
levels. The conditions for each direction of overshooting, and the subsequent reversals 
over the medium run, were interpreted and presented in Table 2. 
Effects of Increased Uncertainty of Food or Goods Supplies: Increased uncertainty 
about the future availability of food or goods supplies is analogous to increased 
uncertainty about future goods prices in the second economy. In the steady state, this 
increase in a, is neutral with respect to S or Pg. Thus, the overshooting that occurs in 
the short run is identical for both the static expectations and perfect foresight cases. In 
the very short-run, there is a jump depreciation of both the nominal and the real black- 
market exchange rate. This is followed by a period of gradual appreciation as the 
economy accumulates dollars through surpluses in illicit trade. 
Exchange-Rate Overshooting with Official Devaluation: Unambiguous statements 
on necessary and sufficient conditions for overshooting following official devaluation 
requires parameterization of the model. Such parameterization presumably would differ 
across economies and is not imposed herein. Short of knowing these elasticities and 
asset proportions within the economy, we are able to provide some limited insights by 
returning to the microfoundations of asset demands derived within the portfolio 
problem of Section 11. 
The inequality of Condition 1 can be rewritten as: 
which, when expanded using the derivations from the optimal portfolio problem, 
provides the following insights: 
i) Role of i,: Given any set of risk-return and asset-supply combinations in an 
economy, a high enough level of i, exists which guarantees exchange-rate 
overshooting. If exchange-rate overshooting does occur, the short run depreciation 
of the domestic currency in black markets will be followed by a period of 
exchange-rate appreciation. At lower levels of i,, exchange-rate overshooting 
following official devaluation may occur, but is not guaranteed. 
ii) Role of c,: All else equal, the higher is c, (the cost of obtaining storable 
goods) the less likely that exchange-rate overshooting will occur in response to 
official exchange-rate devaluations. This result arises because high c, implies 
relatively high shares of domestic and foreign-currency assets in the investor's 
portfolio. Proportionately, portfolio adjustments in response to an S o  increase are 
smaller so overshooting is less likely. As c, falls to lower levels,20 overshooting 
may at some point occur in response to So but this is not guaranteed. 
iii) Role of R. a, and a,: Without more detailed information on the elasticities 
and asset shares in the economy, we cannot make unambiguous statements about 
the linkages between these variables and the likelihood of exchange-rate 
overshooting following official exchange-rate devaluation. 
Exchange-Rate Overshooting with Official Price Reform: In the long run, official- 
sector price increases lead to proportionately higher increases in second-economy prices 
relative to nominal exchange-rate depreciations. Thus, while nominal rates depreciate 
in the long run, real exchange rates appreciate. 
In contrast to the case of official exchange-rate devaluation, exchange-rate 
overshooting after state-sector price reform requires comparison of the size of 
2%e cost of acquiring and/ or storing hoarded goods is assumed exogenous in our model. 
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proportional exchange rate and price increases, in addition to comparisons of the 
coefficients on these terms. There arise two cases for which overshooting may be 
analyzed: 1) the first case has the same conditions and interpretations as those provided 
in the section on exchange-rate overshooting following official rate devaluation. This 
occurs when inequality (13) is satisfied: 
which is calculated by using the long-run proportionate changes in prices and exchange 
rates provided in the Appendix, then substituting in derived elasticities formulas, and 
finally solving. This inequality is more likely to be satisfied when 4 is high relative 
to pgs, and when the second-economy trade balance is not highly sensitive to the black- 
market premium on currency (t, is small). 
Otherwise, 2) the second case arises when the inequality in eq.(l3) is reversed. 
Therefore, when 4 is low relative to pgs, and when the second-economy trade balance 
is highly sensitive to the black-market premium on currency, the following observations 
hold regarding the probability of exchange-rate overshooting in response to official- 
sector price reform: 
i) Role of i,: The higher is i,, the less likely that exchange-rate overshooting 
will occur in response to an anticipated P increase. For lower i,, exchange-rate 
overshooting may occur but this is not guaranteed. 
ii) Role of c,: The effect of c, (the cost of obtaining storable goods) on the 
likelihood of overshooting purely depends on the parameterization of the economy. 
Exchange-Rate Overshooting with Supply Shocks in Goods Markets: These goods- 
supply shocks lead to long-run declines in second-economy goods prices. In the long- 
run, the domestic currency appreciates in nominal terms in the black-markets, but 
depreciates in real terms. The sufficient conditions for short-run overshooting following 
supply shocks in goods markets, such as those that would be attributed to an increase in 
food aid, depend on the sign of the coefficients of the left-hand side and right-hand side 
terms in Condition 2. 
As in the scenario of an official price reform, two analytical cases are possible 
for interpreting the likelihood of exchange-rate overshooting.21 The first case occurs 
when 
(recall eq. 13) and has exactly the same interpretation as in the case of the effects of 
official exchange-rate devaluation. The second case, where the sign of this inequality is 
reversed, has exactly the same interpretation as that in the analysis of the effects of 
official- sector price reforms. 
Finally, for completeness, provided below are the conditions for short-run 
second-economy prices to overshoot their long-run levels in response to the range of 
policy initiatives. 
Condition 3: For oficial-price increases and oficial exchange-rate devaluations 
to lead to short-run second-economy price overshooting, the necessary and 
suficient condition is 
Condition 4: For positive go&-supply shocks and increased food availability to 
lead to short-run exchange-rate overshooting, the necessary and suficient 
condition is 
2 1 ~ o t i c e  that an official price increase and a positive supply shock in goods markets have proportional 
but oppositely signed short-run influences on exchange rates and free-market prices. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has documented the signals that black-market exchange rates and 
second-economy prices give to policy-makers and markets during different stages of 
economic reform. In contrast to previous studies, we use a framework that introduces 
hoarding activity and therefore integrates the real and financial sectors of a developing 
economy. This facilitates analysis of a variety of policy initiatives, including some 
particularly pertinent to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
A clear understanding of the signals from black markets is especially important 
for the reforming economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In these 
countries, exchange rates vis-a-vis Western currencies often are interpreted as indicative 
of some measure of success in economic reforms. While this interpretation may be 
valid under some circumstances, we have shown that short-run appreciations of the 
domestic currency may simply be a by-product of relative speeds of adjustment of 
prices and asset stocks within the economy. Short-run black-market exchange-rate 
appreciations (and therefore reduced black-market premia) may by caused by a number 
of forces, including: the inflow of food aid, appreciations of official exchange rates, 
reduced risk of monetary confiscations, and increased confidence in the availability of 
future supplies of goods. At any point in time, exchange rates and prices reflect 
speculative and transitional demands for currency and for goods and need not reflect 
long-run market-equilibria. The biases (relative to long-run equilibria) implicit in each 
of these prices depend on the structure of announced and implemented policy initiatives 
operating in the economy in transition. Moreover, the adjustment paths for black- 
["-)Im+("-) 
A, 4 S A1 A3 Pg 
iRB <- 
Pg (16) 
The analysis of price overshooting proceeds analogously to that presented for 
exchange-rate overshooting. 
market exchange rates and prices have clear, qualitative dependencies on the structure 
of investment-demand elasticities and the size of various assets relative to the total set 
of investment assets available to households. 
While we have provided the specific conditions for overshooting of exchange 
rates and prices in response to policy announcements and initiatives, the real application 
of the theory is to the experiences of countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, where both goods hoarding and black-markets for foreign currency are 
pervasive. Given specific features of an economy in transition, it may be possible to 
conduct useful empirical studies of the extent of these biases, as well as of expected 
exchange-rate and price overshooting. 
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Technical Appendix: T1 
The problem of the consumer1 investor is captured by the objective function: 
maximize U = E(dw1w) - (R/2)Var(dwlw) 01) 
hl 9 h, 
where w = WlQ is real wealth, Q is the price index of the consumption basket, and R is 
his coefficient of relative risk aversion. Nominal wealth, W, is the sum of stock 
holdings of domestic currency bonds, B, foreign currency holdings, SF, and domestic 
goods hoarded, PBG. The risks and returns of the various processes are given by 
dBIB = ib dt + ab d& (t2) 
dS/S = 41 dt + a, dZ, 03) 
d(BG)lBG = (x- cg)dt + a, dZg 04) 
so that the portfolio shares allocated to the respective assets are given by: 
h, = B G / W , h ,  = SF/W,and % = ( I - A , - % )  = B / W  (6) 
The process driving the price index is: 
dQ/Q = x, dt + a, dZ, 06) 
Using Ito's Lemma, the stochastic differential and its expected valuation and variance 
are derived: 
dwlw = (1- h, - h,)(dB/B) + h,(dF/F + dS/S) + h, (d(BG)lPG) - (dQ/Q) 
+ [-(I -XI -h, )(dB/B)(dQ/Q) + h,[(dS/S)(dF/F)- (dF/F)(dQ/Q) - (dS/S)(dQ/Q)l 
-3c1 (d(BG)lBG)(dQ/Q) + (dQ)'/Q2 I 07) 
If the risks associated with domestic currency savings accounts are uncorrelated with 
other stochastic processes, the expected value and variance of portfolio holdings are 
given by: 
E(dwlw)=(l- A, - QGb) +h, 4I+ h, (x -cg)- @,I+ rh, (P,, - Pfq - P,,) -h,(p,,) +a,' I 
2 2  2 2  2 2 var(dw/w) = (1-11-12 ) (01, ) + "2 (os ) + 11 (og ) + (oq2) + 21112(pg3-211 (pgq) - 212 ( pqS). 08) 
where pi, represents the covarianccs of processes i and j. 
The optimal share of household wealth invested in durables for hoarding 
purposes (A,) and the optimal share of wealth dedicated to portfolio demands for 
foreign currency ( Q  are determined by differentiating the resulting objective function 
with respect to h, and h,. 
where A = (d + d)(d  + 4 )  - (d  +pgS)l  
To formalize the link between the goods prices and the black-market exchange 
rate, we introduce the domestic price index: 
Q = p," pTCla) 011) (t12) i 
where a is the weight of the price of domestic goods P, and (1-a) is the weight of the I 
imported-goods price PTin the consumer price index. Using the variances, covariances 
and expected values of the inflation series, the optimal portfolio shares solve to: 
where A = (d + d)(d  + 4 )  - (d +p,)l 
In order for individuals in this economy with hoarding to hold positive money 
balances, there is a necessary condition on the size of domestic interest rates: 
(4 d ) + ( d  -pgS)(*-cg -pgs 35 > 0 requires ib > ) 4 + 4 -pgs 
Table TI: Short-Run Comparative Statics Results for Asset-Demand Equations 
Sensitivity of Hoarding Demands 
an, - ( d + 4 )   > o  3-  - (d + P , )  < o  
& AR @ AR 
an, (d +4)( (d+<)(X-cg- ib-~gs 
Sensitivity of Portfolio Demands for Black-Market Dollars 
322 - 
- - 
- (d +P,) < O  an, - ( d + < )   > O  
& AR 8 '  AR 
an, - (d  +P,) 
-- > 0  an2 - - - - 
% AR ab AR 
A = (ob2 + 0:) (ob2 + o?) - (ob2 + P ~ 2  > o and demands are normal. 
Appendix l2 
n.1. Long-Run Equilibrium: Comparative-Statics Matrix 
Long-run Comparative Statics Results 
where 
cl = -(det A)-'(A,X, + x 2 ( l  - L , ) ) I Y P , ( ~ , , ~ ~ ~  -a2,aI2) 
and aij are the elements of the A matrix on the left-hand side of the long-run 
comparative statics system. The determinant of this submatrix is positive 
unambiguously. Note that the policy changes denoted by Z are defined by the vector: 
Z =(ob2, a,2, i,, cg ). For example, the long-run effects of an official exchange-rate 
devaluation are: 
and - 
K 
where K = t lg2 PgSO + t2g2P: - t2glP0S > 0 and t - t > 0 and t ,  = txo > 0 .  
I -  9, 
The long-run proportionate changes in prices and exchange rates attributed to an 
increase in official sector prices are given by: 
Short-run Comparative-Statics Matrix (Static-Expectations Case) 
(assuming that dF =dG =O in the very short run.) 
- - 
a0 
so 
A ( 1 - G  o o w;1', A, o 4s - ( I  - A, )pg 
[ ( - A 2 )  A , G  ][LFg]=[O 0 W q  A, 0 - ( I - 2 , ) s  A& 
Short-run Results (Summary) 
where det K = - S F G  < 0 and 
SZ = -(det K)' WG (1,~; + +;(I - A,)) 
PZ = -(dn K)-' IYF (2'2; + A; (1 - A,)) 
Short-run Comparative-Statics Matrix (Perfect Foresight Case) 
0 o WA; a, o 2,s ( I - P  a; 
o o wa; a2 o -(I-a2)s a,pg a: a; 
where, for example, the general form for the perfect-foresight effects of policy changes 
(which supplement the static-expectations effects) is given by: 
this system is relevant and self-inclusive for all unanticipated policy changes other than 
6Z and 6B. 6Z and 6B are neutral with respect to exchange rates and prices in the 
steady-state, and have very short-kn effects beyond those generated from expected 
movements in exchange rates and prices. 
Each policy change yields a distinct 64 and 6x pair that is computed from the 
results of the steady-state comparative-statics matrix. Before inputting those pairs into 
these formulas, it is useful to consider the signs of their coefficients in the formulas 
provided above. For this analysis, we appeal to the comparative-statics of the asset- 
market/ portfolio problem. 
Stability of the Dynamic System 
Is it likely that the reforming economies will respond to market stimuli and over 
time converge on these long-run equilibrium outcomes? A conclusive answer to this 
question is nearly impossible to provide within the highly nonlinear dynamic system of 
our model. Accordingly, computational constraints lead us to analyze the local rather 
than global properties of the dynamic system. Even within the local analysis, we are 
not able to present much more than this system itself, which must be analyzed with 
parameter values drawn from a specific economy. 
For local stability analysis, we begin with the following four equations: 
with W = B+SfF,  +P,Gt 
wheret, = t s  >Oandt2 = t s  >O 
- - 
PI s" 
Assume perfect foresight, so that the expected future value is equal to the actual 
future value. Then, using equations (sl) and (s2) to solve for the percentage changes 
in S and in P. After we solve for the change in S and the change in P (after 
multiplying each of the lines through by S and P respectively), we combine these in 
vector notation with the equations (s3) and (s4) representing changes in F and G. 
Using this system of equation, we can determine the Jacobian matrix of the system. In 
theory, this would be used to solve for eigenvalues and the roots of the dynamic 
system. In practice, without assigning values to the functional forms in our system 
and conducting country specific simulations, there is little that can be said about the 
stability of the system as a whole. 
(sl) and (s2) can be rewritten as: 
which we now can combine with (s3) and (s4) to yield the nonlinear dynamic system: 
- 
(ad- bc)- 
Linearization of this dynamic system yields the following Jacobian matrix, where a = 
(ad-bc)-1. The four eigenvalues of this system then would need to be determined. 
To conduct the stability analysis, it is necessary to parameterize the system using values 
relevant for the specific economy under study. 
